A Review of Peace-building in Timor-Leste after the UNMIT Period

Katsumi ISHIZUKA

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Introduction

Peace-building efforts have been examined by academic research, from which many lessons were learned for the following missions. At the same time, in the post-conflict periods, each case has been reviewed and assessed whether it was successful or not, with a lot of indicators or standards. Interestingly, the assessment of the mission’s success depends on which standards one adopts.

Charles T. Call identifies four standards for success of peace-building that appear regularly in the literature. The first standard concerns security. This minimalist approach concerns the question of whether a war or conflict has recurred after the international peace operations have left. This standard requires that the original conflict that led to the international peace operations should not re-emerge in the early years after the international withdrawal. The second standard concerns a social aspect. This standard involves identifying the root causes of the conflict and establishing whether they have been resolved by the international mission’s presence. The third standard is political. This standard involves a measure of whether an effective state or legitimate political regime exists after the mission’s end. The fourth standard deals with an economic aspect. This standard uses the economic recovery as a measure for mission success and includes indicators such as GDP and poverty levels. Presumably, while these four standards are not equally assessed, they are among the most common and universally accepted standards in concluding the extent of success of each peace-building case by the UN.

This paper applies the four standards of Charles Call to the case of Timor-Leste. The international community provided a significant amount of commitment and contribution to peacekeeping and peace-building in Timor-Leste. Since 1999, the international community had provided Timor-Leste the non-UN security missions such as INTERFET.
and ISF mainly led by Australia, and UN political and peacekeeping operations such as UNAMET, UNTAET, UNMISSET, UNOTIL, and UNMIT. The last international operations, UNMIT and ISF completed their missions at the end of 2012, and currently Timor-Leste identifies the so-called “post conflict” period. Therefore, this paper deals with the review of peacekeeping and peace-building in Timor-Leste with Charles Call’s four standards of successful peace-building. After arguing four standards, this paper conducts comparative analysis with the cases of Haiti, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka.

Security

The first UN peacekeeping force in Timor-Leste was UNTAET deployed as a comprehensive nation-building mission in 1999. Following the UN peace operations of UNTAET, UNMISSET, and UNOTIL, the UNMIT period identified very few problems involving pro-Indonesian militias. This is partly due to the improvement of the state’s diplomatic relations with Indonesia.

Meanwhile, the security crisis in 2006 which inevitably required the establishment of UNMIT was not caused by pro-Indonesian militias but by more domestic factors such as political rivalry. And UNMIT evaluated its own mission highly positively in terms of security maintenance. In accordance with the reports of the Secretary-General, the security situation had improved, in which the statement “the overall situation in Timor-Leste remained calm” almost became jargon. In fact, the Secretary-General report indicated, for example, that the incidence of serious crimes such as murder, abduction and rape significantly decreased to 9 cases per month during the period of January to August 2007 from 29 cases per month in the last reporting period. This figure was further decreased to 5 cases per month during the next period of August 2007 to 7 January 2008, was decreased to 4 cases during the next period, and then to only 2 cases per month during the period of July 2008 to January 2009.

Meanwhile, the most serious incident during the UNMIT period was the assassination attempts of President Jose Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao by the group of rebel leader Alfred Reinado on 11 February 2008. On these events, President Ramos-Horta was seriously wounded, and Reinado was shot to death. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon condemned this attempted coup including the attack on the President as “brutal and unspeakable” and condemned “in the strongest possible terms these unacceptable attacks on the legitimate institutions of the state.” Initially, Prime Minister Gusmao issued the 48-hour’s state of emergency and afterwards Parliament extended it for another two months.

The post-independence period in Timor-Leste witnessed the regular occurrence of security turbulence such as the riots of December 2002, the incidents in Lospalos in

Furthermore, state security in Timor-Leste has been significantly damaged when it is linked to the involvement of Timorese youth gangs called “martial arts groups (MAG)” and the following occurrences of excessive force by the national police (PNTL) and/or the national military (F-FDTL). In fact, the issue of MAG – comprising an estimated 90,000 members, or just under one-tenth of the population – became a serious concern by UNMIT during their missions before its departure from the state in 2012.

James Scambary defines these groups as informal security groups with a wider framework, even including rural-based millenarian groups, veterans groups and political-front groups. There are more than three hundred of these groups in contemporary Timor-Leste. These groups have been deeply rooted in the society of Timor-Leste, dating back to the Portuguese era. It is problematic that high-ranking leaders are often employed in senior positions in government, international NGOs, and even UN agencies in Timor-Leste. Group members can also be found throughout civil society organizations, including human rights and even conflict-resolution NGOs. Therefore, in Timor-Leste, Timorese members of UN agencies and conflict-resolution NGOs might also be members of the (in)security groups in Timorese society which might generate the causes of conflicts, a potential for the state to request international peace missions in the future again.

In accordance with the Secretary-General’s report, an incident of concern occurred on 7 July 2009 when a fight broke out between youth gangs at a market in Bobonaro District. In 2010, the Secretary-General was cautious about a number of violent incidents between young gangs. One of the most serious took place on 16 December 2010 in Ermera District where one person was killed, two were injured and 24 houses were destroyed. On 14 August 2011, a fighting between members of two MAGs in Covalima District led to the burning of 58 houses and the displacement of 168 families with 33 suspects arrested. Furthermore, there is a growing concern that a number of MAG-led incidents have involved PNTL and F-FDTL officers. Therefore, the Council of Ministers decided that any PNTL or F-FDTL members who were found to be involved in such incidents would be subject to disciplinary measures, including dismissal from their respective institutions. Finally, on 3 March 2014, the Timorese parliament unanimously approved a measure that authorized the national police to put an end to the activities of two notorious MAGs, namely, KRM and CPD-RDTL.
Min Timor-Leste, it would be the culture of rivalry, hostility, resistance and violence. Lee Jones argued that successful peace-building involves not just the construction of institutions but also the construction of viable socio-political alliance that can agree on how state institutions and capacities are to be created, developed and prioritized. He maintained that the history of Timor-Leste, especially under the Indonesian rule, indicated that many Timorese led by FRETILIN resisted the imposition of Indonesian state structures on the territory. Thus, from the very beginning the state apparatus took a markedly coercive form that was reliant on heavy military spending from Indonesia. Furthermore, Indonesian state-building failed to penetrate Timorese society. Instead, it became interpenetrated with it. The anti-FRETILIN elite provided militias, joined the local administration and parliament and formed alliances with the Indonesian military to retain existing or establish new businesses. Indonesia ruled through local tribal chiefs as Portugal had before it.16

Root Causes (Social)

Call defines root causes of modern conflicts as a social aspect, since most of the internal conflicts in the post-Cold War conflicts such as in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have been related to religions and ethnicity. However, in the case of Timor-Leste the conflicts in September 1999, which required the international missions such as INTERFET and UNTAET, were the militia campaigns led by anti-independence groups instigated by the Indonesian troops, TNI. Therefore, the root causes of the conflicts in Timor-Leste, which were not religious and ethnic conflicts, were not social but political. In this sense, UNTAET played a role not only as a traditional administrator in East Timor but also as a political bridge between Indonesia and East Timor. Consequently, East Timor, which was named officially as Timor-Leste, achieved independence in May 2002.

However, if one still considers the social aspect as the root causes of the conflicts in Timor-Leste, it would be the culture of rivalry, hostility, resistance and violence. Lee Jones argued that successful peace-building involves not just the construction of institutions but also the construction of viable socio-political alliance that can agree on how state institutions and capacities are to be created, developed and prioritized. He maintained that the history of Timor-Leste, especially under the Indonesian rule, indicated that many Timorese led by FRETILIN resisted the imposition of Indonesian state structures on the territory. Thus, from the very beginning the state apparatus took a markedly coercive form that was reliant on heavy military spending from Indonesia. Furthermore, Indonesian state-building failed to penetrate Timorese society. Instead, it became interpenetrated with it. The anti-FRETILIN elite provided militias, joined the local administration and parliament and formed alliances with the Indonesian military to retain existing or establish new businesses. Indonesia ruled through local tribal chiefs as Portugal had before it.16

UNTAET had similar experience as the previous Indonesian rule in Timor-Leste. UNTAET was unable to graft its ideal-type state onto Timorese society. Instead, the emerging Timorese state became subject to emerging rivalries over power and resources in the impoverished territory.17 It can be recognized by the security crisis in Timor-Leste in 2006. The 2006 crisis was triggered by social conflicts between Timor-Leste
Defense Force (F-FDTL) and the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL), between “westerners” and “easterners”, and between Timorese political leaders. These conflicts have been attributed to their own social backgrounds. Many members in F-FDTL are former FALINTIL guerrillas who fought against Indonesian’s security forces, and many members of PNTL used to serve with Indonesian police. Many western parts of Timor-Leste gained a reputation as pro-Indonesian stronghold, while many easterners had a more resistant stance against Indonesia. As mentioned before, the politicians were divided between those who spent the years of Indonesian occupation in exile like Mari Alkatiri, and those who remained in East Timor like Xanana Gusmao. Such social divisions, combined with the legacies of resistance and violence which tended to mobilize irregular armed groups for political ends, resulted in incessant internal conflicts in Timor-Leste. Irregular armed groups in Timor-Leste also have a long tradition to have been mobilized and trained by a succession of colonial powers, including Portugal, Japan and Indonesia.

The social legacy of resistance was also identified in Timorese people. Since 1999 Timorese have felt increasingly free to criticize and question their political leaders, and that they had a sufficiently strong “opposition culture” to vote to change the government in 2007.

Matthew Arnold claimed that the petitioners and mutineers in the 2006 crisis highlighted the limits of what international actors can achieve within the context of an indigenous political situation that is in manic flux. These events indicated that the UN missions had not played a significant role to enhance domestic security. It is partly because the UN missions could not solve the social problems, which were not direct but indirect causes of traditional conflicts in Timor-Leste.

In the history of the involvement of international organizations in post-conflict areas, peace-building and state-building have tended to be an easy access to the political and legal areas. Political issues such as democratization and election monitoring, and legal issues such as justice and human right monitoring, have been positively tackled by UN peace operations. However, the social aspects and values such as the cultural and traditional issues are rather difficult for external organization to touch upon even if they might be the causes of intractable conflicts. This tendency can be recognized in the case of Timor-Leste.

Political

When one defines the political success in the post-conflict peace-building process as the implementation of democratic elections, Timor-Leste is, without any doubt, a politically successful case in building a democratic country. Timor-Leste conducted parliamentary elections in 2001, 2007 and 2012. Presidential
elections were also successfully conducted in 2002, 2007, and 2012. Timor-Leste also adopts multi-political system. The first parliamentary election in 2001 saw the participation of twelve parties. At the last parliamentary elections in 2012, CNRT, led by Prime Minister Gusmao, won 36.66 per cent of the votes; FRETILIN, led by former Prime Minister Alkatiri won 29.87 per cent; the Democratic Party (PD), led by National Parliament President Fernando de Araujo, won 11.30 per cent; and Frenti-Mudanca (FM), led by Vice-Prime Minister Jose Luis Guterres, won 3.11 per cent.\(^{22}\)

Meanwhile, there have been two characteristics featuring politics in Timor-Leste. First, there have been political rivalry and hostility in Timor-Leste. Especially, division in the national political leadership between Gusmao and Alkatiri had been deteriorating after Alkatiri’s FRETILIN wrote an independence constitution that created a weak presidency for Gusmao to take assume.\(^{23}\) The second political characteristics in Timor-Leste were it’s “winner-takes-all” approach, and the country’s hierarchical and closed political culture. While these characteristics contributed to the success of a national resistance movement, it has been detrimental to political legitimacy and democratic process in Timor-Leste.\(^{24}\)

In fact, both Gusmao and Ramos Horta lacked respect for the state’s constitution. Both of them had been able to engage in areas of activity that lacked sufficient support in the constitutional letter. It was recognized in the first president’s creation of a team to work on the issue of veterans. Though this issue was taken up by Prime Minister Alkatiri in 2005, President Gusmao was in charge of final decision of this particular policy. Meanwhile, Ramos Horta, replacing Gusmao’s presidency, considered it his duty to offer an “emergency aid” to cases of particular hardship. He created a team that provided responses to such appeals within one month. In both cases, the presidents in Timor-Leste took an initiative on conducting some executive duties, regardless of the restrictions that the letter of the constitution imposed on the president’s powers in this domain.\(^{25}\)

The president Horta’s unilateral decision was also identified in his pardons in recent years which resulted in the release of actors in the 2006 crisis, including the former interior minister. After the 2006 crisis, although the four soldiers were convicted by the civilian court and sentences ranging between 10 and 12 years, they did not spend any time in civilian prison. Instead, the F-FDTL set up military detention facilities following the conviction, to detain the convinced soldiers. The convinced soldiers continued to receive salaries while the widows of the slain PNTL officers did not receive their compensation payments of US$2,500 from each of the individual soldiers, which was ordered by the court decision in 2007. An opinion poll conducted by Asia Foundation in 2008
indicated that an overwhelming majority of respondents did not support pardons for serious crimes, and no political party gave support to Ramos Horta’s proposal of establishing a truth-for-amnesty system for those involved in the 2006 crisis.\textsuperscript{26} Nevertheless, the president’s policy of political pardon controversially culminated in August 2010, when the authority released 26 soldiers and paramilitary police officers who had been convicted of serious crimes related to the 2006 crisis.

In Timor-Leste, political pardons are highly related to political and social culture of patron-client relationship.\textsuperscript{27} In other words, “clients” are likely to be given pardon by the politicians or their “patrons”. This manipulation can be possible due to the absence of strong political institutions in Timor-Leste, which, however, exacerbated reliance on patron-client networks as the source of political power. Therefore, the survival of political elites in the “winner-takes-all” culture depends on the success of their network, and giving pardons to “clients” has been significant patronage resources and methods.\textsuperscript{28} Thus, state-building in post-conflict areas is thwarted by the use of patronage resources.

A patron-client network can be identified not only between politicians and convicted persons but also politicians and youth gangs. This network has resulted in the significant deterioration of domestic security and state-building on the whole in Timor-Leste.

The political dogma was also identified in the relations between the UN and the political figures in Timor-Leste. First, like previous UN missions in Timor-Leste, UNMIT was committed to its engagement primary with state authorities, paying less attention to an advocacy role for a wider Timorese community. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Atul Khare, had a point of his weekly consultations with senior political leadership in the state. The security crisis in 2006 demonstrated a lack of political reform, which was partly due to the UN’s sole alignment to senior level political leaders.\textsuperscript{29} Meanwhile, the political leaders in Timor-Leste kept some distance from the policy and guidance provided from the international community including UNMIT. Ramos Horta’s decision of political pardons was clearly a result of his marginalizing stance from the recommendation of an Independent Special Commission of Inquiry that 63 people should be prosecuted in the 2006 crisis.\textsuperscript{30} The audit group of the UN dispatched to Timor-Leste in 2009 also accepted that UNMIT’s security sector advisers were underutilized primarily due to the Government’s lack of cooperation with UNMIT’s support.\textsuperscript{31}
enthusiasm or reluctance to host the UN missions. This case was exactly what had happened in the latter periods in UNMIT before withdrawing from Timor-Leste on the end of December 2012. Therefore, the withdrawal of UNMIT did not necessarily mean the resolution of political aspects in the post-conflict state-building in Timor-Leste.

**Economic**

Countries with low human development tend to experience more civil conflicts than those with higher levels of human development. According to statistics of UNDP, more than half the countries with a GDP capita of US$2,000 or less in 1990/91 experienced some form of civil war between then and the year 2000; less than one fifth of countries of GDP per capita over this mark experienced. Conflict itself retards human development, and this generated a cycle of violence and development failure.\(^{32}\)

Timor-Leste had witnessed impressive economic growth rates from 2007-11 (10% in 2011). One can also see a decline in official poverty rates, the population on or below the poverty line of $0.55 per day, from 50% to 41%.\(^{33}\) Yet, Timor-Leste is still suffering from national poverty. The state has a low Human Development Index ranking, the 134th. Life expectancy is 55.5 years, and 73 per cent have no access to electricity.\(^{34}\) The 2009-2010 Demographic and Health Survey found little improvement in children nutrition since 2007, with 45% of children under 5 years old underweight. The amount which the poor spend on food has not kept pace with GDP growth.\(^{35}\)

There are very few industries which will hopefully contribute to economic growth and support national finance in the future. A coffee industry, which is one major economy in Timor Leste, decreased its export in 2013, and cereal production also fell by 20% in the same year. In fact, the current governmental policy towards economic recovery has been short-sighted, which can be recognized by the fact that Timor-Leste is one of the most petroleum-dependent countries in the world. Oil and natural gas revenues have been providing more than 98 per cent of government revenues.\(^{36}\) The Petroleum Fund plus foreign exchange reserves, which are $14.9 billion, are 9.2 times annual non-oil GDP. Since the natural resources in the national territory in Timor-Leste, mainly in Timor Sea, have been considered to be exhausted in a decade, the financial resources for the government in the future would be far from optimistic.

Nevertheless, the expenditure of the government in Timor-Leste has been excessively generous to the vulnerable, especially, after the security crisis in 2006. Each petitioner in the 2006 crisis was eligible to receive $8,000 – 70 times the monthly minimum civil service wages. Between 2008 and the end of 2010, the government closed all the IDP camps and spent $56.8 million in
recovery grants. Most of this was in the form of family grants of $4,500 for those who could produce evidence of their home’s destruction. The government’s aggressive expansion of spending was also identified in welfare and civil service. The cash grant for the elderly had improved monthly payments of $20 to all over 60 since May 2008. Likewise, the benefits for single mothers with children have been paid when they enrolled in schools. Above all, the amount of the pensions to veterans of the struggle for independence was enormous, ranging from $2,760 to $9,000. The above three pensions, which are for the elderly, single mothers and veterans, have about 110,000 beneficiaries in the small state of Timor-Leste with the population of only 1 million.

Evidently, the government could afford these expenditure due to temporal but enormous amount of revenues from fees and royalties deprived from offshore oilfields. It has also contributed to post-independence stability and security. However, an economy dominated by petroleum exports itself generates little employment and invest in little productive activity. Needless to say, the government is required to create a new and substitute industry for sustainable development in economy of Timor-Leste after the limited amount of natural resources is exhausted in the near future. In August 2011, parliament approved the amendment to the 2005 Petroleum Fund Law, allowing for increased flexibility of investment in various instrument and the possibility of obtaining loans. On the whole, economic recovery and human development were identified in Timor-Leste, which contributed to peace-building in a positive way, while one cannot be optimistic about the perspective of sustainable development of economy in Timor-Leste.

Comparative Analysis

This section conducts a comparative analysis among the states which experienced internal conflicts. The purpose of this analysis is to compare Timor-Leste with other states experiencing internal conflicts, in considering the effectiveness and the extent of success of their peace-building process. Three states, Haiti, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka which this analysis focuses on, are considered to be instructive to compare with Timor-Leste. Haiti is the case in which the state hosted UN peace operations, UNMIH and MINUSTAH, the same case as Timor-Leste. Afghanistan is the case in which the state hosted non-UN peace operations, namely, ISAF. Sri Lanka is the case in which the state experienced internal conflicts but hosted no international peace operations. The indicators of the success of peace-building in this analysis are GDP per capita as an economic factor, mortality rate as a human development factor, democracy index as a political factor, and corruption perception index as a social factor. (See Tables 1 to 4.)
### Table 1. GDP per capita (US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Timor-Leste (UN mission)</th>
<th>Haiti (other UN mission)</th>
<th>Afghanistan (non-UN mission)</th>
<th>Sri Lanka (no international mission)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>822</td>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>2003</td>
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<td>314</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<td>520</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>628</td>
<td>374</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>644</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>451</td>
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<td>818</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>561</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: The World Bank)

### Table 2. Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live birth)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Timor-Leste (UN mission)</th>
<th>Haiti (other UN mission)</th>
<th>Afghanistan (non-UN mission)</th>
<th>Sri Lanka (no international mission)</th>
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<td>1999</td>
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<td>109</td>
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<td>2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: The World Bank)

### Table 3. Democracy Index (including world ranking out of 165 countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Timor-Leste</th>
<th>Haiti</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Sri Lanka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>6.41 (65th)</td>
<td>4.19 (109th)</td>
<td>3.06 (135th)</td>
<td>6.58 (57th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>7.22 (47th)</td>
<td>4.19 (110th)</td>
<td>3.02 (138th)</td>
<td>6.61 (57th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>7.22 (42nd)</td>
<td>4.00 (111th)</td>
<td>2.48 (150th)</td>
<td>6.64 (55th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>7.22 (42nd)</td>
<td>4.00 (114th)</td>
<td>2.48 (152nd)</td>
<td>6.58 (57th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>7.16 (43rd)</td>
<td>3.96 (116th)</td>
<td>2.48 (152nd)</td>
<td>5.75 (89th)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Full mark: 10, Source: the Economist)
There would be several reasons why Sri Lanka did not have to have any international peace missions despite the serious conflicts between the Sri Lankan military and the Tamil Tigers but its peace-building process was relatively successful. One of them would be because Sri Lanka was economically developed compared with other states hosting international peace missions such as Timor-Leste, Haiti and Afghanistan, as can be seen from Table 1.

Among the four indicators, the democracy index is the only one whose figures Timor-Leste had improved and the other three states had deteriorated. Peace-building at least in the political sector has been partially successful in Timor-Leste since the state has been slowly but steadily democratized. In contrast, the democracy index of Afghanistan had deteriorated despite the intervention of the huge NATO-led operations.

Peace operations in Timor-Leste and Haiti have several conditions in common. Both of them had not only UN peace operations but also the short-term Chapter VII-led non-UN forces: INTERFET in Timor-Leste in 1999 and...
international community to peace-building and state-building. The success of peace-building in Timor-Leste was also identified in the political sector on the ground of the implementation of parliamentary and presidential elections supported by the UN operations. In the comparative analysis, especially between the cases of UN peace-building Timor-Leste and Haiti, Timor-Leste showed better records than Haiti and Afghanistan in all of the indicators such as GDP per capita, mortality rate, democracy index, and corruption perception index.

Nevertheless, this paper also concludes that the peace-building process in Timor-Leste has not been so optimistic. It was recognized by the security and political culture of rivalry and hostility involving youth gangs, a politically “winner-takes-all” approach, and the following marginalization of judicial and constitutional values by the politicians. Likewise, the negative aspects were identified by the social nepotism and corruption, and the short-sighted economic vision by the government excessively dependent on the state’s limited natural resources.

Conclusion

This paper applied Charles Call’s comprehensive standards on the success of UN peace-building to the case of Timor-Leste. On the whole, the post-conflict peace-building in Timor-Leste has played a positive role in the sectors of security and economy. Currently, pro-Indonesian militias are far less likely to disrupt Timorese society and security, and the subsequent economic stability was due to the efforts of the UN and the
the limitations of their mission areas. Such limited mission areas includes the efforts to solve or mitigate the negative culture and tradition of the states’ security, social and political aspects which are vulnerable to the outbreaks of civil wars and internal conflicts.

Note


6) The Age, 13 February 2008


8) In April 2005, more than 5,000 people gathered outside government offices to demand Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri’s resignation in the peaceful demonstration.


17) Ibid. p. 558


32) UNDP Human Development Report for Timor-Leste 2011, p. 70


36) Naazneen H. Barma p. 285

37) International Crisis Group, “Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost?”, Asian Report No. 246, 8 May 2013, p. 3. But programs faced serious challenges from fraud, and while steps were taken in both cases to reduce the number of improper claims, this remained a serious issue. Ibid. p. 4
