

The Effect of the Dual Approaches of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

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国連レバノン暫定軍におけるデュアル・アプローチの効果

The Effect of the Dual Approaches of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

石塚勝美

ISHIZUKA, Katsumi

This article deals with UNIFIL's two approaches to implement the mandate, which are totally different from each other in the characteristics. One is the "soft approach", which is humanitarian assistance to local people by peacekeeping personnel (soldiers and officers) of UNIFIL. Humanitarian assistance is not the core task for UN peacekeeping operations, although it is said to provide "hearts and minds" to the locals. In terms of humanitarian assistance in UNIFIL, it has been a traditional task. It seems that more intractable UN peacekeeping operations are, more invaluable the peacekeepers consider humanitarian assistance in the operations. The other approach is the new one and the "hard approach", which is the special and robust units from the developed countries, especially, the European contributing states. UNIFIL is a rare exception among the peacekeeping missions for a number of reasons. One of them is the deployment from the contingents from European nations which have deployed in UNIFIL with some heavy armaments and advanced military equipment.

This article focuses on the dual approaches, the soft- and hard approaches of UNIFIL in south Lebanon and argues if it is effective.

Introduction

One of the paradoxes in terms of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations is identified in the name of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). UNIFIL was established in south Lebanon in 1978 with the mandate of supervising ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. UNIFIL has been deployed for more than 40 years in spite of the name of

"the Interim Force". In fact, whenever the ceasefire was broken and a significant scale of warfare between Israel and Lebanon including Hezbollah, happened, in 1982, 1993, and 1996, UNIFIL had been ineffective, not having the capability to prevent them and even to protect the local civilians. Meanwhile, after the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, UNIFIL was re-created with the more robust mandate and the larger troops.

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Key words : UNIFIL, dual approach, humanitarian assistance, European contingents

This article will deal with UNIFIL's two approaches to implement the mandate, which are totally different from each other in the characteristics. One is the “soft approach”, which is humanitarian assistance to local people by peacekeeping personnel of UNIFIL. Humanitarian assistance is not the core task for UN peacekeeping operations, although it is said to provide “hearts and minds” to the locals. In terms of humanitarian assistance in UNIFIL, it has been a traditional task. It seems that more intractable UN peacekeeping operations are, more invaluable the peacekeepers consider humanitarian assistance in the operations. The other approach is the new approach and is the “hard approach”, which is the special and robust units from the developed countries, especially, the European contributing states. UNIFIL is a rare exception among the peacekeeping missions for a number of reasons. One of them is the deployment from the contingents from European nations which have deployed in UNIFIL with some heavy armaments and advanced military equipment.¹⁾

This article will focus on the dual approaches, the soft- and hard approaches of UNIFIL in south Lebanon and argue if it is effective.

The Effect of Dual Approaches of UNIFIL

The soft approach – humanitarian assistance tasks

UNIFIL has traditionally provided humanitarian assistance to local population in the area of operations. In fact, humanitarian missions have been consistently demanded

since the early periods of UNIFIL. According to Skogmo, the humanitarian tasks became even more important in the period between the second Israeli invasion on 6 June 1982 and the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in February-June 1985, when UNIFIL could do very little to implement any of the three parts²⁾ of the original mandate. In this situation, it became essential to give UNIFIL meaningful tasks, both to justify its continued presence and keep up the morale of UNIFIL's troops.³⁾ In the mid 1980s, UNIFIL cooperated with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in extending assistance to the local people. Humanitarian assistance was extended to refugees as well as local populations in Lebanon. For example, in 1985, a number of Christian refugees sought safety in UNIFIL, where they received shelter, food and other provisions. The confidence-building value of these operations became an important asset for UNIFIL.⁴⁾

In the late 1990s, the norm of “protection of civilians”⁵⁾ in armed conflicts was broadly advocated in the international community. The newly advocated norm promoted the legitimacy of humanitarian assistance in UN peacekeeping operations. Meanwhile, humanitarian assistance by UNIFIL has not always been successful. In April 1996, Israel launched *Operation Grapes of Wrath*, a 16-day campaign to end the shelling by Hezbollah from southern Lebanon. On 18 April, the Israeli troops shelled a

compound of the Fijian Battalion's headquarters at Qana which housed about 800 Lebanese refugees.⁶⁾ The shelling killed 106 civilians. Israel emphasized that it was Israeli policy to target civilians or the UN. Israel, therefore, rejected any responsibility for it, claiming that "any damage caused to UNIFIL", is "the direct consequence of terrorist aggression and Lebanese collusion." UNIFIL, to much extent, lost credibility due to the incident.⁷⁾

Many troop contributing states to UNIFIL have also valued a humanitarian aspect in their mission in UNIFIL. For example, Ireland is a typical contributing state which has a consistent and positive policy towards humanitarian assistance in UNIFIL. Despite the constraint of their location between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the South Lebanese Army (SLA) to the Islam Resistance emerging from the north, Irish battalions did not stop offering humanitarian aid to the local people. McDonald cites the example of the 64th battalion, which suffered the biggest number of casualties in Lebanon but provided various forms of humanitarian assistance: donating \$1,700 to buy diesel oil for the Tibnin hospital; setting up medical clinics in Ayta Az-Zutt, Brashit and Tulin; buying glass for a damaged mosque in Quabrika, etc.⁸⁾ In 2008, at the International Conference for Support to Lebanon, the Minister for Education Affairs Noel Treacy announced that the Irish contribution will reach 5 million euros in bilateral humanitarian and recovery assistance in the aftermath of the 2006 war that cost

Lebanon 1,200 deaths, over one million displaced, and large-scale destruction.⁹⁾

One interpreter of the Irish Battalion pointed out the educational contribution of the Irish troops to South Lebanese local people:

Arising from the Irish battalion's presence many of the local people, especially the younger generation, are able to speak the English language without having to study it in schools. This, in turn, allows the young people to stop and talk with the Irish soldiers which helps to cement and build a relationship and to bring all concerned closer together. In some of the villages, teaching in schools, especially those opposite the security zone, would not be possible but for the presence of Irish troops during teaching hours.¹⁰⁾

During the author's interviews in the Irish Headquarters in UNIFIL in August 2019, a number of Irish soldiers and officers referred to humanitarian missions as a core task in Lebanon. One officer stated that UNIFIL has been evolving since his first deployment in the 1990s. When he was first deployed in the 1990s, UNIFIL was regarded as a pure operational mission which supervised peace in the Blue Line between Israel and Lebanon. Currently, the officer stated that the first priority is to support local people, the second is to train the Lebanese Armed Forces, and the third priority is the operational mission. His statement might be rather exaggerated although he implied that the evolution of UN

operations means the enhancement of local peace and the more focus on humanitarian activities.¹¹⁾

However, it is to be noted that all of the troops contributing states to UNIFIL do not consider humanitarian assistance with same value. In this context, it is significant to pay attention to Chiara Ruffa's article "Military Cultures and Force Employment in Peace Operations." This article compares between the French and Italian troops in the military cultures and its reflection in their policy and attitude towards the peace operations in UNIFIL. French military culture is very cautious and consistently emphasizes an assertive fighting spirit. Meanwhile, Italian military culture is more humane. They came to consider themselves ineffective but good soldiers. As a consequence, in UNIFIL, the French troops prioritized operational activities, such as extensive patrolling or training of the local armed forces, and displayed high force-protection levels. The Italian troops focused on humanitarian activities, such as implementing development projects and distributing toys to children, displayed low levels of force protection, and did much less patrolling than the French.¹²⁾

In 2018, Vanessa Newby published a new book, *Peacekeeping in South Lebanon: Credibility and Local Cooperation*, which extensively covers the content of humanitarian aids by troop contributors to UNIFIL. According to the book, most battalions provide some form of medical and dental care for the local population living in their areas. Some have

a hospital that local residents can visit twenty-four hours a day, and all medical services and medication provided by battalion are free. In addition, many battalions also operate an outreach service whereby they visit the villages in their area on a rolling basis and set up a medical center to provide care locally.¹³⁾ The Spanish and the Indian contingents in UNIFIL uniquely offer veterinary care in Sector East. This service appears more popular than the medical services. Local farmers, who are shepherds, said that the veterinary service is an incredible advantage in Lebanon where there are few veterinarians, who charge high fees for their services. Newby described that the veterinarians service by UNIFIL helps to improve the economic environment of the region, as it enables farmers to continue to function and produce goods for sale on the market.¹⁴⁾

After the 2006 war, UNIFIL innovated the new humanitarian project, the so-called "Quick Impact Project". Quick Impact Projects are funded by UNFIL headquarters with a total annual budget of US\$500,000. Each battalion in UNIFIL is allowed to submit proposal for spending the fund in order to meet local needs with the maximum of US\$25,000 for each project. The projects vary, from providing the solar system lights to teaching computer or yoga.¹⁵⁾

Meanwhile, there are several concerns on humanitarian missions provided by UNIFIL contributing states. First of all, humanitarian assistance itself is not included in the mandate of UNIFIL. In other words, even if the

humanitarian assistance receives positive evaluation and popularity among locals and host states, it is not categorized as a main task of UNFIL. It means that it could not be described as fulfilling a protection mandate.

In reality, compared to the daily military tasks including supervising ceasefire and patrolling, the effect of humanitarian assistance is relatively tangible and therefore the rewarding jobs for troop battalions in peacekeeping operations. As a result, the author's field research in 2019 indicated that several Irish senior officers, who have long experience as peacekeepers in UNIFIL, tend to value the missions of UNIFIL as humanitarian. One senior officer said that the essence of peacekeeping is the protection of local people, not the protection of UN personnel. The senior officer even mentioned that as the Irish peacekeepers are engaged in UNIFIL for a longer time, they tend to feel their humanitarian tasks as their individual commitment rather than their official duties in the Irish Defence Forces.¹⁶⁾ Although senior military officers are, in general, required to prioritize strategic aspects in the mission, they tend to regard the humanitarian aspects as their individual commitment. The above case illustrates that peacekeepers in UNIFIL tend to overestimate the value and effect of humanitarian assistance in the mission of UNIFIL. It is somehow an illusionary tendency.

The second concern over the humanitarian assistance mission in UNIFIL is its relations to Hezbollah in Lebanon. When Israel unilaterally withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah

filled the resulting power vacuum. Hezbollah is a Shiite Islamist political party and militant group based in Lebanon. As a political party, Hezbollah and its coalition, referred as March 8, has held 57 of Lebanon's 128 parliamentary seats since the 2009 election. Since October 2016, March 8 received 17 of 30 cabinet positions, thus establishing Hezbollah's consistent influence in Lebanon. Hezbollah has a military presence in 240 villages in southern Lebanon, according to the estimates of the Israeli Defense Forces in 2017. Hezbollah has gained grassroots popularity to integrate itself into local community and Lebanese society.¹⁷⁾

In fact, during the 2006 war with Israel, Hezbollah provided emergency relief services and distributed water, and medicine to Lebanese Shiites and Christians. One Lebanese Shiite, who was interviewed by CNN during the war, said "Hezbollah is doing all the things for the people. I don't know where the government is."¹⁸⁾ Hezbollah said that it spent \$300 million for the construction work to repair damaged or destroyed homes. The provision of Hezbollah's essential services has included health care and even veterinarians, which has been a viable alternative to the Lebanese state, enhancing its domestic popularity among the citizen. Hezbollah has created its own educational institutions that parallel to the Lebanese state. Hezbollah first opened the schools in 1993 in southern Lebanon. By 2006, approximately 14,000 students attended Hezbollah's schools. By 2013, the schools were present throughout the state.¹⁹⁾

Meanwhile, it is to be noted that Hezbollah

has not been an internationally recognized and legitimized party. In fact, there are several international agreements and resolutions calling for Hezbollah's disarmament, including The Taif Agreement in 1989 and UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in 2006. It means that UNIFIL has been in the difficult situation operating in in south Lebanon where Shiite Lebanese is the majority. On the one hand, one part of the mandate of UNIFIL was to restrict Hezbollah's presence in south Lebanon. On the other hand, UNIFIL has to conduct humanitarian assistance in south Lebanon, where 86 percent of Lebanese Shiites held favourable views of Hezbollah.²⁰⁾ Accordingly, local people in south Lebanon reject UNIFIL's objective to disarm Hezbollah and delegitimize it as a resistance party. Furthermore, as Lise Morje Howard described, UNIFIL's conflict resolution paradigms of funding, inaugurating, and documenting humanitarian projects can be understood as attempts to compete with Hezbollah's own humanitarian and social activities in the region.²¹⁾ Susann Kassem developed Howard's view:

*Hizbullah has become a respected and entrenched authority in the south. The reality is that there is little distinction between Hizbullah and the community: Hizbullah is part of the community and not an alien force that can be simply pushed out. In the bigger picture, UNIFIL's ostensible attempt to supplant Hizbullah seems quixotic.*²²⁾

Kassem's field research indicated that the

Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) conducted by UNIFIL, described above, was overall not as successful as UNIFIL had expected. Kassem asserted that while QIPs had been welcomed, the villagers and municipalities had even refused to cooperate on key issues such as accepting the Blue Line demarcation, allowing UNIFIL to move freely in their village center, or allowing searches of buildings for weapons. Kassem's continued:

*According to Kheir's deputy mayor, the municipality sends only specific people to UNIFIL events to purposely prevent UNIFIL from building its desired relations with their villagers outside the authorities' supervision. It should be noted that there is a very apparent general apathy among villagers about being involved in such events.*²³⁾

The above case clearly indicated that local people in south Lebanon have welcomed humanitarian assistance from Hezbollah rather than UNIFIL. The unwillingness of the local to join the QIPs by UNIFIL also attributed to their cooperative attitude with Hezbollah to accept to conceal its military equipment and weapons in their properties. In fact, since 2006, Hezbollah has generally avoided an explicit military form, including open display of arms and uniforms. Instead, it carries on its military operations in a civilian cloak, and illicit nongovernmental military deployment in UNIFIL's area of operations.²⁴⁾ It made UNIFIL humanitarian tasks more difficult.

The hard approach – the special and robust units from the European contributing states

While UNIFIL has paid a significant attention to humanitarian assistance by encouraging a confidence-building measure with locals as a soft approach, it has also focused on the hard approach by providing the special and robust system and units, which is rather unusual as UN peacekeeping operations. For example, UNIFIL has introduced the establishment of Strategic Military Cell in the UN Headquarters in New York, the intelligence units, unmanned aerial vehicle, a Maritime Task Force etc. These special units and forces have been provided mainly by the European troop countries.

Originally, when UN peacekeeping operations were invented and introduced to international conflicts during the Cold-War periods, the European countries as well as Canada and Australia were the major players of the UN operations. In fact, the European countries accounted for about 41 percent of the total contributing states in the major UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold-War. However, the European states had been departing from UN peacekeeping operations, and instead joining the EU framework in order to establish EU-led peace operations. Furthermore, the European states indicated the commitment to the “War on Terror” after the so-called “9.11” terrorist attack in the US in 2001, and dispatched their troops to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

Table 1 showed the number of the dispatch of troop personnel of the main 22 European

states’ contribution to UN peacekeeping operations and ISAF, 1996-2007. Out of 22 European states which were positive contributors to UN peacekeeping operations in 1996, 16 states decreased the number of troops dispatched to UN peacekeeping operations in January 2007. And 15 states out of the above 16 states dispatched their troops to ISAF. Noticeably, 15 European states out of 22 of the above dispatched their troops to UNIFIL in January 2007. It is highly unusual that the European states, which generally lost their enthusiasm to participate in UN peacekeeping, showed their willingness virtually only to send their troops in UNIFIL. Indeed, only one UN operation, namely UNIFIL, accounted for 78.5% of the total troops of 22 European states dispatched to all of the UN peacekeeping operations in January 2007. This figure is exceptionally high, considering of the fact that there were more than 10 UN peacekeeping operations in the world in those days. In short, many European states showed their commitment only to UNIFIL among all of the UN peacekeeping operations.²⁵⁾

When the war between Israel and Hezbollah ended in 2006, both parties accepted the UN plan of reinforcing UNIFIL as a means to ensure a ceasefire. Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) authorized UNIFIL to “take all necessary action” to ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel and humanitarian workers and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. The UN mission which has a mandate requiring “all necessary action” means that the mission

Table 1 The Number of the Dispatch of Troop Personnel of Main European States' Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations and ISAF, 1996-2007

Contributing States	Dec. 1996	Jan. 2007		
	UN PKO	UN PKO	UN missions deployed	ISAF
Poland	1097	653 ↓	UNDOF344, UNIFIL319	160
Finland	924	218 ↓	UNIFIL 213, UNMIL 3, UNMIS 2	70
Austria	867	377 ↓	UNDOF 373, UNFYCIP 4	500
Belgium	836	361 ↓	UNIFIL 361	300
Romania	787	0 ↓		750
Ireland	745	492 ↓	UNMIL 331, UNIFIL 161	10
Norway	732	139 ↓	UNIFIL 171, UNMIS 2	350
Slovak Rep.	588	292 ↓	UNFYCIP 196, UNDOF 96	50
France	502	1868 ↑	UNIFIL 1,680, UNOCI 185, MINUSTAH 2, UNMIL 1	1000
Ukraine	438	300 ↓	UNMIL 300	0
Portugal	406	146 ↓	UNIFIL 146	150
UK	405	276 ↓	UNFYCIP 276, UNMIL 3, UNMIS 3	5200
Germany	173	930 ↑	UNIFIL 913, UNMIL 12, UNMIS 5	3000
Sweden	168	70 ↓	UNIFIL 68, UNMIS 2	180
Denmark	125	55 ↓	UNIFIL 48, UNMIS 6, MINURSO 1	400
Hungary	102	88 ↓	UNFYCIP 84, UNIFIL 4	180
Netherlands	100	174 ↑	UNIFIL 171, UNMIS 3	2200
Bulgaria	79	0 ↓		100
Italy	71	2427 ↑	UNIFIL 2427	1950
Czech Rep.	49	0 ↓		150
Spain	47	1108 ↑	UNIFIL 1108	550
Turkey	40	526 ↑	UNIFIL 522, UNMIS 4	800

Source: Military Balance 2012, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Monthly Summary of Troop Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations, as of 31 December 1996 and 31 January 2007.

should be robust and coercive with relatively heavy military equipment. Israel insisted that new UNIFIL should be rather the multi-national force which has the strong military capability enough to prevent Hezbollah's belligerent action against Israel. Therefore, the Israeli government insisted on the participation of the European armed forces to meet its request. In this situation, France indicated its willingness to take a lead, insisting on having a European general that could command UNIFIL in the crisis situation. French proposal was

compromised by the establishment of a special Strategic Military Cell (SMC) in the UN HQ in New York. This was a dedicated military structure mainly staffed by officers from the troop contributing states of UNIFIL. Then France announced 1,600 extra troops for new UNIFIL. In August 2006, the EU foreign ministers discussed with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, formalizing their offers for UNIFIL contributions. The European contributing states to newly enhanced UNIFIL in 2006 included France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Poland,

Germany etc. Germany took a lead of a Maritime Task Force (MTF), monitoring and patrolling Lebanese territorial sea waters.²⁶⁾

In 2016, A. K. Bardaklai stated that current UNIFIL's force structure is completely based on the organization of a NATO force.

*The European contingents include some specialized units such as the technical support unit, logistic unit and CIMIC unit. ... As for the equipment profile, while France has its army's main battle tanks and radars as part of its Quick Reaction Force (QRF), Italy has deployed wheeled armored vehicles fitted with big bore main guns. ... Combat troops are also employed for protection of the contingent bases. ... The cumulative effect is that the boots on ground are less than even one-third of the overall deployed strength.*²⁷⁾

In fact, some Europeans' hard approach has been successful. For example, MTF was, for the first time, deployed alongside national ground troop contingents in UN peacekeeping operations. According to the research by Karim Makadisi, operating off the Mediterranean coast of Lebanon, MTF navigates some 5,000 square nautical miles, compared to the 300 square miles monitored by UNIFIL ground troops. MTF has succeeded in gaining Lebanese support by ending the Israeli sea embargo of Lebanon. Since MTF was deployed, the German contingents have enjoyed communication with Israel Navy. The German contingent in MTF demonstrated a high degree

of military vigilantism, so the Israeli Air Force reduced its over-flights of the MTF area of operation. Germany also contributed two vessels from Bremen sea police, which strengthened the Lebanese naval capability. Germany has also taken lead in establishing the bilateral agreement with the Lebanese Government by supporting a project, called the Coastal Radar Organization (CRO). The CRO is comprised of a chain of seven radar stations along the coast of Lebanon. The advanced radar system of CRO has enabled Lebanese authorities to detect vessels in their territorial waters and issue warning signals. Germany's role as lead-nation of MTF was highly positive and Germany is potential to future maritime operation in UN peacekeeping operation.²⁸⁾ In fact, UN Secretary General expressed the positive evaluation to MTF in his report to UN Security Council in July, 2019.²⁹⁾

From the European points of view, contributing to UNIFIL with modern technologies and heavy equipment serves European interests. Many European states participated in ISAF in Afghanistan. In 2014 ISAF terminated its mission, when the European troops looked for the next mission to main their military equipment, technologies and knowhow which they provided to NATO-led ISAF. UNIFIL was the ideal alternative to ISAF for the Europeans. Ray Murphy, a professor at the University of Galway, Ireland, also said that a number of European states contributing to UNIFIL II did facilitate operational effectiveness even though the militaristic approach of some contingent

proved counter-productive.³⁰⁾

Meanwhile, there is also a broad consensus that one could identify several concerns on the so-called “hard approach” of UNIFIL by the European states or NATO member states. For example, Lise Morje Howard, who is a professor and generally ardent supporter of UN peacekeeping operations, said that the large influx of western troops to UNIFIL in 2006 made it appear that it would supply security guarantee in south Lebanon.³¹⁾ However, Morje was also critical of the combat-type of operations conducted by NATO states in UNIFIL:

[in 2006] *Many of the troops arrived after serving in NATO missions, where the force posture was geared for war fighting. This approach did not prove effective in South Lebanon. In 2007, six Spanish peacekeepers were killed, most likely by Hezbollah, which many interpreted as a message to back off from the robust force posture.*³²⁾

*Newly arrived Europeans are also more likely to behave arrogantly and assume what are perceived as aggressive or unfriendly postures. Speeding vehicles and patrolling in tanks or other heavy armored means of transport are often perceived as offensive to locals.*³³⁾

There has been a tendency for NATO states to import its philosophy to UN peacekeeping operations. Bardalai argued that the well-trained and well-equipped peacekeepers from

these countries tend to look at every incident in the mission through a military prism and try to separate the black from the white.³⁴⁾ He also pointed out that the robust European states have not always been positively accepted by other national contingents in UNIFIL:

*... in spite of different ethnicity, religious faith, tradition and culture, there is something common amongst the non-Western national contingents. Social adjustment comes with ease amongst these nations. For instance, hosting peacekeepers from different contingents for a meal without any prior information or invitation is quite common amongst the non-Western contingents. ... While those from European nation appear robust and hence are probably perceived as arrogant, the other group finds better acceptability in the Lebanese society.*³⁵⁾

Conclusion

It can be concluded from this article that the dual approaches of UNIFIL in south Lebanon has the mixed effect. The soft approach which is a humanitarian assistance task has traditionally positive records and achievement among most of the troop contributing states in UNIFIL. Especially, in UNIFIL, where its core mandate has not been implemented for more than 40 years, peacekeeping soldiers and officers have considered the great value on it. It also contributes to the enhancement of the quality of lives for the locals. This value is being paid more attention at the present time when

the humanitarian norm of Human Security and the Protection of Civilians has been strongly advocated. However, in reality, since many locals, most of whom are Hezbollah supporters, do not psychologically accept the deployment of UNIFIL, they have not welcomed the humanitarian assistance of UNIFIL. It is partly because they consider that UNIFIL has been tasked to disarm Hezbollah and partly because it seems to them that UNIFIL and Hezbollah have been competing each other in providing humanitarian assistance to the locals.

Meanwhile, the hard approach of UNIFIL which comes from the special and robust units from the European contributing states has also provided the mixed effect. The special technologies, skills and knowhow in UN peacekeeping operations would be increasingly demanded in modern UN peacekeeping operations at the present time when international conflicts are getting more complicated and more dangerous than before. UNIFIL is not an exceptional case, and it is to be noted that UNIFIL is required to contact and negotiate with Israel which possesses highly developed military technologies. Thus, the demand on the provision of the European troops' sophisticated and robust equipment and technologies has been increasing in UNIFIL. This article highly evaluated the contribution of the Maritime Task Force led by Germany, which contributed to ending the Israeli sea embargo of Lebanon, detecting other vessels in the territorial waters and reducing the frequency of the overflight of the Israeli Air Forces. Meanwhile, some are critical of the

European contingents who are deployed in the combat, aggressive and arrogant mood, trying to separate the black from the white in their missions. Likewise, the European contingents cannot be preferably integrated with the contingents from other regions.

What can be concluded from this article? It can be said from the soft approach that UN peacekeeping operations can provide limited effect and limited peace from the limited acceptance from the states concerned and the locals. It can be concluded from the hard approach that contributing states which provide hard and robust system and technologies are still required to keep the essence of peacekeepers such as modesty and integrity in mind.

notes

- 1) A. K. Bardalai "UNIFIL: The Many Challenges of Successful Peacekeeping", *Journal of Defence Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 3, July-September 2016, pp. 67-68
- 2) The three parts of UNIFIL's original mandate in Security Council Resolution 425 (1978) are: 1) to confirm an immediate Israeli cease-fire and withdrawal from Lebanese territory, 2) to restore international peace and security; and 3) to ensure the restoration of Lebanese governmental authority and its territorial integrity etc.
- 3) Bjorn Skogmo *UNIFIL: International Peacekeeping in Lebanon, 1978-1988* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), p. 91
- 4) Ibid. p. 94
- 5) In February 1999, the first debate on the protection of civilians was held in the UN Security Council, which adopted a presidential statement

- expressing grave concern over the civilian toll of conflict casualties. Then the UN Secretary-General was requested by the Security Council to submit annual reports with recommendations on how it could improve both the physical and legal protection of civilians in situation of armed conflicts.
- 6) Cpat. David R. Williams “A most painful lesson: The 1996 Shelling of Qana, why it matters today” https://www.army.mil/article/166556/a_most_painful_lesson_the_1996_shelling_of_qana_why_it_matters_today. Accessed on 24 August 2020
 - 7) UN Document S/1996/337, *Israel’ Shelling of UNIFIL*, 7 May 1996
 - 8) “Irish Peacekeeping in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL): A Historical, Political, and Socio-Cultural Study”, *UN in the Arab World*, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, Research Study, June 2013, p. 17
 - 9) Ibid. p. 18
 - 10) Comdt. Brendan O’Shea (ed.) *In the Service of Peace: Memories of Lebanon* (Dublin: Mercier Press, 2001), p. 133
 - 11) Interview with an Irish officer, Irish Battalion Headquarters, UNIFIL, 26 August 2019
 - 12) Chiara Ruffa, “Military Cultures and Force Employment in Peace Operations”, *Security Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 3, p. 393
 - 13) Vanessa Newby *Peacekeeping in South Lebanon: Credibility and Local Cooperation* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2018), p. 142
 - 14) Ibid. p. 143
 - 15) Ibid. pp. 145-146
 - 16) Interview with the Irish officers, the Irish Headquarters, UNIFIL, 23-26 August 2019
 - 17) Augustus Richard Norton “Hezbollah’s Influence in Lebanon”, Counter Extreme Project, April 2018, p. 1
 - 18) Ibid. p. 26
 - 19) Ibid. p. 31
 - 20) Augustus Richard Norton “Hezbollah’s Influence in Lebanon”, p. 3
 - 21) Lise Morje Howard, *Power in Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), p. 124
 - 22) Susann Kassem “Peacekeeping, Development, and Counterinsurgency: The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and ‘Quick Impact Projects’” in Karim Makdisi and Vijay Prashad (eds.) *Land of Blue Helmets: The United Nations and the Arab World* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017), p. 469
 - 23) Susann Kassem “Peacekeeping, Development, and Counterinsurgency: The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and ‘Quick Impact Projects’” in Karim Makdisi and Vijay Prashad (eds.) *Land of Blue: The United Nations and the Arab World* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017), p. 468
 - 24) Assaf Orion “Hiding in Plain Sight: Hezbollah’s campaign Against UNIFIL”, Policy Note, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 2019, p. 3
 - 25) Katsumi Ishizuka “History of Europeans’ Participation in UN Peace Operations: Should the European State Go back to UN Peacekeeping?” a presentation paper, Annual Meeting of Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS), The Hague, the Netherlands, 11-13 June, 2015
 - 26) Alexander Mattelaer, “Europe Rediscovered Peacekeeping?: Political and Military Logics in the 2006 UNIFIL Enhancement”. Egmont Paper 34, Egmont, Royal Institute for International Relations, Academia Press, October 2009, pp. 9-12
 - 27) A. K. Bardalai “UNIFIL: The Many Challenges of Successful Peacekeeping”, *Journal of Defence Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 3, July-September 2016, pp. 69-70
 - 28) Karim Makdisi, Timur Goksel, Hans Bastian Hauck and Stuart Reigeluth, “UNIFIL: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon

- and the Middle East, EuroMesco Paper, January 2019, pp. 28-32
- 29) UN Document S/2019/574, *Report of the Secretary-General*, 17 July 2019, paras. 21-23
- 30) Ray Murphy “Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Civilian Protection”, *Journal of Conflict & Security Law*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2012, p. 393
- 31) Lise Morje Howard, *Power in Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), p. 127
- 32) Ibid. p. 110
- 33) Ibid. p. 113
- 34) A. K. Bardalai “UNIFIL: The Many Challenges of Successful Peacekeeping”, *Journal of Defence Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 3, July-September 2016, p. 74
- 35) Ibid. p. 73